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Article 6

OPEN COURT

OPEN COURT
NORTH CAROLINA MAGISTRATES

This article is written from an earnest conviction that the legal
profession is recreant to its duty, both to the public and to itself, in
regarding with indifference the deplorably low personnel of the North
Carolina magistracy. Particularly is this appeal made to our older
brethren to abandon their complacency and to awake to the deeper
implications of the situation. Most of us who have reached the age
when girths wax and hair wanes rather preen ourselves that we have
graduated from the turmoil of J. P. practice and mentally wash our
hands of the whole business. I speak of this matter especially to
those who flatter themselves that they are not affected by it. Their
facile isolation will not bear analysis.
At the outset, let me make my sincere, and indeed humble, apology
to that small but courageous minority of our J. P.'s who, in the face
of a lamentable breakdown of the system, still manage to carry to
the performance of their duties an integrity of mind and heart, and
a native self respect which lift them above the chicanery and pettifoggery so rampant about them. There are many worthy magistrates in North Carolina, and any wholesale condemnation carries
with it a regrettable injustice to many an honest and respectable
man who suffers in public esteem an undeserved obloquy. To this
corporal's guard apparently facing an early extinction I pay my
tribute of respectful and grateful admiration. The only fear which
has given me pause is that my strictures may wound the sensibilities
of some of that Gallant Few who still entertain in their courts a
respect for fair dealing and who temper their proceedings with a
genuine love of justice.
The angle of the problem now urged upon the attention of those
lawyers who do not feel themselves concerned is this. All of us who
have the least affection for, or appreciation of, the profession which
gives us our daily bread genuinely desire, and are willing to strive
for, an elevation of the plane of practice and an improvement in the
personnel of the legal fraternity. We approve wholeheartedly the
most sweeping declaration of the Supreme Court in its insistence
upon good moral character in those who seek admission to the bar.
In re Applicants for License,
(In re Dillingham, 188 N. C. 165.
191 N. C. 235.) Dean Ferson was roundly applauded and widely
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praised for his address before the North Carolina Bar Association
at Wrightsville setting forth the policy of law schools here and
everywhere to demand constantly a careful selection and a more
extensive training of those who so soon will be taking their places
in the profession. Yet with all our insistence upon good moral character in the applicants for license, with all our bar associations and
their codes of ethics, with all our exhortations to our oncoming members to maintain the high traditions of our profession, we furnish
them an actual introduction to the practice of law which gives the
lie full in the face to our pretty speeches and which makes a mockery
of all our codes of ethics. Any fledgeling lawyer who can go through
three years of J. P. practice and retain his ideal of high-minded
service in an honorable profession has a toughness of virtue beyond
all praise. It is not for the unlucky suitor that I am now concerned.
The sovereign remedy of an appeal usually meets the necessities of
his case. The thing which preys upon me is the fear that we invite
the abasement of the moral texture of our profession in exposing
our initiates at the most impressionable state to a so-called administration of justice in which every ideal of the profession is treated
with the most brazen cynicism.
To those who have personal and frequent contact with magistrates' courts, it is unnecessary to describe more definitely the evils
referred to. But for those who view these constitutional courts
from afar or whose acquaintance is principally with magistrates of
an older and sounder type, it may not be amiss to cite a few instances, not important perhaps in themselves, but indicative of a
rather general condition.
Exhibit A is a magistrate in whose hands an appearance bond of
substantial size was placed and who converted it to his own use,
never trying the case. Exhibit B is a magistrate who was also in
the public employment in another capacity. For making improper
advances to a young girl going to his office on business he lost his
regular job, but remains a magistrate. Exhibit C is a magistrate
from whom personal property deposited in lieu of bail could be recovered only by legal proceedings. Exhibit D is a magistrate who
received his appointment shortly after being heavily fined for violation of the prohibition law, not forsooth for having liquor presumptively for sale, but for making an actual back-alley sale for
gain to one not a friend. Exhibit E is a magistrate who has appropriated all fines collected in his court to his own use. Under threat
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of indictment, settlement with the county was made but he remains
a magistrate. Exhibit F is a magistrate who for similar misappropriation of fines was indicted but evaded arrest until actually
run down by officers and captured in a corn field. Exhibit G is a
magistrate who for months did a land office business disposing of
warrants for a particular class of criminal offenses of which to his
knowledge he had no jurisdiction. Exhibit H is a magistrate who
undertook with vulgar epithets and violent abuse to silence a negro
defendant who ventured to assert his innocence of a criminal charge.
It is interesting to note that both of the men found by the Supreme
Court in the opinion in 191 N. C. 235 to be lacking in upright character were justices of the peace at the time.
Instances like the foregoing could be multiplied indefinitely by
one who undertook an investigation. Enough for the present purpose. They relate themselves primarily to a lack of average good
character and the need of redress is obvious to a layman. But there
are practices even more incensing to a practicing lawyer. Exhibit
I is a case where a magistrate, apprehending that defendant's counsel
would remove the case, deliberately misled the defendant as to the
time of trial and rendered judgment for plaintiff. An appeal does
not quite soothe one's feelings in such a case. Exhibit J is a case
where both the plaintiff and the magistrate were absent when the
defendant and his lawyer appeared at the time set for trial. The
magistrate left word with a bystander for defendant to come back on
another specified day. Again the defendant and his lawyer appeared
in vain. When the defendant finally found the magistrate, judgment
had already been rendered for the plaintiff and the time to give notice
of appeal had expired. The trouble and expense of a recordaridoes
not adequately meet such a situation. Lest the suspicion arise that
the writer is grouchy about losing cases, let it be understood that
no case has been cited with which he has had any professional connection whatever. The instances cited have been gathered from lawyers in several different counties of the state.
Let us consider now a few general statements. We all know
magistrates before whom it is utterly useless to appear if one of several of his good customers is of opposing counsel. We all know magistrates whose decision of a given case can be accurately foretold
before the introduction of the testimony if one knows the nature of
the case, or the identity of parties, or counsel. Many of us know
magistrates who sound out in advance the views of other magistrates
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so as to utilize them in case of a demand for a removal. In fact,
hunting in pairs is a practice excessively hard to meet. Of course
the most widespread evil is one which flows from inadequate mental
training rather than from conscious wrong doing; namely, the regular custom of deciding cases from personalities, prejudices, or favoritism, rather than in accordance with evidence.
The reader, if a layman, is wondering why magistrates guilty of
some of the -egregious wrongs cited above are not put out of office.
And if the discussion were shifted to lawyers he would wonder why
many of them are not disbarred. The answers are probably the same.
In the first place the Legislature has always resolutely declined to
provide workable machinery. Proposals to simplify procedure for the
disbarment of attorneys have been killed. And a meritorious bill to
give the Governor power to remove magistrates from office was
cleverly limited in the last Legislature to those magistrates who had
been appointed by the Governor. Chap. 116 Laws 1927. For those
named by the Legislature only impeachment or prosecution is permitted. The wider bill prepared in the office of the Attorney-General was apparently considered as implying the possibility of the
Legislature's making a mistake in the selection of its appointees.
Away with such aspersions upon Legislative Infallibility! Why not
impeachment or prosecution then? Again the answer is also applicable to infrequency of disbarments. There are two reasons,-one
worthy, one not,-namely, indifference and soft heartedness. As to
the latter there will probably be no quarrel. But the indifference of
members of the bar to the conditions herein described is deserving of
a solemn protest. The trouble is that the more influential lawyers are
little affected. The younger ones adjust themselves to it as best they
may. And in requiring them to make that adjustment we are doing
a very grave wrong to our profession.
Fundamentally, of course, the problem is not to get rid of the
bad magistrates but to keep the bad ones from getting in. Just
before or during the last Legislature, Mr. John A. Livingstone, special correspondent of the Raleigh News and Observer, performed a
real public service in publishing a series of articles on this general
subject. Incidentally, he revealed that in Wake County, for instance,
only a small minority of the magistrates had filed any reports to
court as required by a statute, the violation of which is a misdemeanor. One might safely bet that not twenty per cent. of all the
magistrates in North Carolina ever file a report. But to come back
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to Mr. Livingstone. He demonstrated quite conclusively that the
real source of the trouble is the excessive prodigality of our system
of creating magistrates. We have held the emoluments of the office
down so severely that few competent men will take the job and then
we have tried to offset our penuriousness by opening 'the door to
anyone who desired to be a magistrate. Of course one necessary
result is that there is such competition for business that desirable
magistrates cannot earn enough to retain their interest in the job.
Consolidated Statutes 1463 provides for three magistrates for each
township and for an additional magistrate for each one thousand
inhabitants in any city or town in said township. In most cases that
would be too many. But not content, the Legislature each session
passes an omnibus bill appointing as magistrates everybody whom
any legislator wishes to so honor. And finally, to be perfectly certain that the plague of ill-qualified magistrates shall not diminish,
the Governor is authorized to appoint as many more as he sees fit
(C. S. 1468). With such a system it is strange that we do as well as
we do. Apparently magistrate-making gets to be a sort of mania.
For the county in which I write (Edgecombe) some original-minded
lesser statesman has had passed a special act authorizing the election
of one magistrate for each one hundred electors in each township.
In a state noted for great fecundity in the production of magistrates,
Edgecombe towers above the other counties as a sort of potential
magisterial Reuben Bland. The result of this act (C. S. 1464) is
that if the most arrant knave in No. 12 Township (containing half
of Rocky Mount) wishes to be a magistrate and is an elector, his
own sole vote assures his election and the only possible way to beat
him is to get some thirty-five candidates to run against him. Could
there be a greater absurdity?
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court (Tunwy v.
Ohio, 71 L. Ed. 508, discussed in 5 N. C. L. Rev. 357) seems to mean
that our method of compensating a magistrate in criminal cases only
when he convicts the defendant is unconstitutional because it is contrary to due process of law for a defendant to be tried before one
with a pecuniary interest in the outcome. This decision may necessitate a revamping of our whole system. Leaving aside the particular point to which the court's decision is directed, the following
general suggestions are offered. There should be elected not to
exceed one magistrate for each eight thousand inhabitants in a township estimated according to the last census with a minimum of two

